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Abstract 
In this essay, I quantitatively analyze the significance of scholarship in economic philosophy 
since the 1960s. In order to do so, I examine, through the number of publications and 
citations, the evolution of the main trends in economic philosophy over a fifty years period. 
This paper will develop a better conception of how the pathways of major debates, in 
particular rhetoric of economics (RoE) versus realism in economics (RiE), helped economic 
philosophy achieve its present status in economics. Viewed through this lens, it is clear that 
the main trends in the recent history of the discipline have emerged out of the concerns of 
non-mainstream economists since the 1980s. 
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The Oomph in Economic Philosophy:  
A Bibliometric Analysis of the Main Trends, from the 1960s to the Present 
 
Introduction 
The number of publications and average number of citations that each publication gets within 
economic philosophy have increased over the past few decades. There are now a considerable 
number of independent journals for economic philosophy (Economics and Philosophy, 
Journal of Economic Methodology, Journal of Philosophical Economics, Erasmus Journal of 
Philosophy and Economics, Revue de philosophie économique, Oeconomia – History / 
Methodology / Philosophy, and Economic Thought: History, Philosophy, and Methodology) 
as well as a number of history of economic thought and heterodox economics journals (such 
as History of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Issues, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Kyklos etc.). Additionally, printing houses (Routledge and Edward Elgar) are 
increasingly publishing peer reviewed articles and books on philosophical topics within 
economics. A number of graduate programs, mainly in Europe, such as those at Erasmus 
University, the London School Economics, the University of Bayreuth, the University of 
Helsinki, and at Kingston University, have been launched, granting graduate degrees in 
economics and philosophy. Scholars in economic philosophy are prominent figures not only 
in economic philosophy but also in economic history, the history of economic thought, and 
the philosophy of science. From a scholarly point of view, economic philosophy has become 
an established field of research in social sciences.  
However, in the undergraduate and graduate curricula of economics departments 
around the world, interest in economic philosophy has been waning. There has been a 
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sustained decrease in the numbers of dissertations and hours of courses in which economic 
philosophy is studied and taught. The job market for economic philosophers is also limited. Is 
this a contradiction or an inevitable stage in the process of a discipline becoming 
autonomous? Is economic philosophy separating itself from the standard economics 
curriculum? 
In this essay, I quantitatively analyze the significance of scholarship in economic 
philosophy since the 1960s. In order to do so, I examine, through the number of publications 
and citations, the evolution of the main trends in economic philosophy over a fifty years 
period. This paper will develop a better conception of how the pathways of major debates, in 
particular rhetoric of economics (RoE) versus realism in economics (RiE), helped economic 
philosophy achieve its present status in economics. (On the significance of intellectual path 
dependence in the history of economic thought, see (Yalcintas 2006a, b, 2012, 2013, 
Forthcoming, Yalcintas and Gurpinar In Progress).) Viewed through this lens, it is clear that 
the main trends in the recent history of the discipline have emerged out of the concerns of 
non-mainstream economists since the 1980s. 
Scope and limitations 
Economic philosophy is a branch of the philosophy of social science where its practitioners 
study the epistemological, ontological, and rhetorical issues in economic argumentation such 
as rationality, positivism, ethics, and causation. In other words, economic philosophy “is to be 
understood simply as philosophy of science applied to economics” (Blaug 1980 [1987], xi). 
(For the scope and several definitions of economic philosophy and economic methodology 
see, Hands 2008, Backhouse 2008, Hausman 1980, 1989, Gerrard 1990, Georgescu-Roegen 
1979, Lange 1945) This essay argues that a question such as “What is economic philosophy?” 
requires one to be curious about measuring the “oomph” of publications in the field. Oomph, 
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a term coined by Deirdre McCloskey and Stephen Ziliak (McCloskey 1986, 1992, Ziliak and 
McCloskey 2004), means that the quantitative significance of scholarship in a particular field 
of research is as important as its qualitative content. Thus, oomph in economic philosophy 
refers to the impact of economic philosophers’ contributions and implies the measurement of 
the explanatory power of arguments that scholars in this field put forth. In other words, 
oomph is the measurement of scholarly attention (Klamer and van Dalen 2002) that an 
argument or scholar in a specific field gets over any number of years. The significance of the 
citation analysis in this essay is therefore to provide bibliometric evidence quantifying claims 
made by prominent authors who have already provided comprehensive definitions of 
economic philosophy as well as detailed accounts of the breaking down of “received views” 
in the history of the discipline and economic methodology becoming a “separate science.” 
(Hands 2001b 70-127, Düppe 2011, Ross and Kincaid 2009, Mäki 2008, Davis 2007, Blaug 
1980 [1987], Caldwell 1982, Backhouse 1994, Boylan and O'Gorman 1995, Stewart 1991). 
A considerable amount of scholarly energy in bibliometric analyses has been spent in 
the last decade or so on the uses and misuses of impact factors and indexes such as the h-
index and the j-index, evaluating the relative performance of universities, journals, and 
individual scholars. (See for instance (Klein and Chiang 2004, Moed 2005).) This essay is 
unconcerned with any of these tools and suggests a different direction for acquiring evidence, 
not based on the performance of individual scholars but based on the evolution of the main 
trends in economic philosophy over a fifty years period. Bibliometric analysis is a quantitative 
methodology based on the number of times a particular scholarly work is cited in a specific 
field. Bibliometric analysis is different from “philosophical analysis” and “rhetorical 
analysis,” a distinction first made by McCloskey (1990a, 1994a). Philosophical analysis is a 
compilation of techniques to break concepts into smaller pieces so as to eliminate 
inconsistencies around the issue and produce true (or truer) claims on or about the facts of the 
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world. By contrast, rhetorical analysis “does not deal with Truth directly; it deals with 
conversation” (McCloskey 1985 28). Bibliometric analysis, on the other hand, is a 
methodology that assesses the significance of a scholar, scholarly work, or journal by way of 
calculating how frequently others cite an item. Bibliometric analysis is therefore a 
measurement of scholarly attention. It complements philosophical and rhetorical analyses. 
However, since it is insufficient to evaluate the scholarly significance of an item solely by the 
number of subsequent publications that cite it, quantified data should be supplemented by 
qualified background knowledge in the field of research. Bibliometric analysis is therefore 
useful in a number of respects but its limitations must be respected. Below, I briefly 
summarize the scope and limitations of the bibliometric analysis conducted in this essay. 
 There are a sufficiently large number of citations in economic philosophy in 
order to reach conclusions about the main trends within a specific period. It is important to 
note that the structures of citations in economic philosophy tend to resemble those found in 
the humanities more closely than the applied sciences, including economics. However, 
comparing economic philosophy to the philosophy of science or social sciences or indeed any 
subfield in the humanities is unhelpful due to different structures of citations, such as the non-
commonality of co-authorship, limited number of journals in the field, limited number of 
years that economic philosophy has been autonomous, and limited number of references. 
Bibliometric analysis in this essay therefore excludes citation ratios among disciplines (that is, 
“economic philosophy vs. constitutional political economy” or “economic philosophy vs. 
discourse analysis in sociology”) and focuses on citation ratios within economic philosophy. 
 One-dimensional evaluation (that is, analyzing only qualitatively or only 
quantitatively) is misguiding. Figures of publications and citations are only subtle indication 
of the significance of scholarship in economic philosophy and neither qualitative nor 
quantitative analysis is entirely sufficient for the job. Often, qualitative analysis partially 
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matches qualitative analysis, though mismatch does not refute the significance of either 
analysis. On the contrary, a mismatch can help increase the sophistication of the overall 
analysis.  
 Citation analysis is sensitive to measurement errors. This is a limitation that 
mostly applies to online search engines. For instance, some of the articles freely available on 
the Internet are ranked higher by Google Scholar, such as Social Science Research Network 
(SSRN) and Munich Personal RePec Archive, than by commercial publishers. Also, Google 
Scholar fails to distinguish between an article and a book that have the same title, such as 
McCloskey’s “The Rhetoric of Economics” (1983) and The Rhetoric of Economics (1985). 
Last but not least, Google Scholar does not only count the “scientific” citations a publication 
gets but it also considers blogs, advertisements, and reviews, some of which are non-
academic. 
 Contrary to the scholarly practices in natural science, co-authorship is not a 
common practice in economic philosophy. Articles in economic philosophy greater than 
twenty pages in length tend to have a single author, whereas articles of only three or four 
pages in the natural sciences commonly have more than ten authors. Senior scholars in natural 
science research groups are often included as an author whereas this practice is rare in 
economic philosophy.  
 More published material in economic philosophy is published in the form of 
books. Some authors in economic philosophy, such as Alexander Rosenberg and Jon Elster, 
publish as many books as articles, which are not evaluated in many indexes, including the ISI 
Web of Knowledge. (ISI’s Book Citation Index was launched in November 2011.) By 
contrast, in natural sciences, far fewer books are published than articles. 
 Although ISI is perceived as the “gold standard” in bibliometrics and is indeed 
a reliable source of data, its limitations must not be overlooked. For instance, ISI only covers 
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journal articles that are chosen by the authorities of Thomson Reuters. This is a serious issue 
for bibliometric analysis because the journals chosen by ISI for evaluation do not include 
many of the important economic philosophy journals, such as the Journal of Economic 
Methodology, the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, and the Journal of 
Philosophical Economics. 
 EconLit provides a more inclusive and scholarly list of journals in economics. 
However, EconLit does not provide any quantified data, preventing its use for bibliometric 
analysis. JSTOR, another scholarly data provider, covers only a handful of economics 
journals, mainly mainstream journals and almost no philosophical journals in economics, 
omitting such notable journals as the Journal of Economic Methodology and the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics. 
 In order to acquire the greatest quantity data, I use Google Scholar, EconLit, 
and RePec where available in order to assess the journal articles and books that are excluded 
by ISI and JSTOR. I have determined that the Google Scholar scores match closely with the 
scores provided by ISI and JSTOR, despite the fact that Google Scholar ranks authors and 
publications according to their popularity among Internet users. This suggests that the lists 
produced by Google Scholar, ISI, JSTOR, EconLit, and RePec are useful even though these 
data providers use different algorithms to evaluate the academic performance in terms of 
citations. 
Economic philosophy in citations 
FIGURE 1 HERE ABOUT (Note to the editor and referee(s): metadata available in Excel file) 
Figure 1 illustrates the total number of citations of the following scholars between 1960 and 
2011: Amartya Sen, Herbert Simon, Jon Elster, Mark Blaug, Geoffrey Hodgson, Deirdre 
McCloskey, Philip Mirowski, Tony Lawson, Arjo Klamer, Uskali Mäki, Kevin Hoover, 
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Daniel Hausman, Bruce Caldwell, Wade Hands, and John Davis. Figure 2 provides a more 
focused picture of recent debates in economic philosophy. Scholars in this figure are 
organized into two groups. Group B consist of Hodgson, McCloskey, Mirowski, Lawson, 
Klamer, Mäki, Hoover, Hausman, Caldwell, Hands, and Davis and Group C McCloskey, 
Lawson, Klamer, and Mäki. Needless to say, grouping scholars into only two groups despite 
the wide variety of debates and the richness of their different positions in economic 
philosophy may appear somewhat simplistic and arbitrary. However, as this essay does not 
seek neither a “nothing-but” account of the history of economic philosophy nor a clear 
definition of the borders of the discipline, adding up the citation figures of other important 
authors, such as Warren Samuels and Roger Backhouse, would not have dramatically altered 
the relative shape of the trends in both figures, although excluding any one of these 15 
influential authors would seriously compromise the quality and content of the analysis 
conducted here. These authors are considered to represent the main trends of philosophical 
debate in economics to which scholars from Millian, Popperian as well as pragmatist and 
realist traditions have contributed in the last five decades. 
FIGURE 2 HEREABOUT (Note to the editor and referee(s): metadata available in Excel file) 
Figure 1 suggests that there is a great deal more interest in economic philosophy today than 
there was in the 1960s. Figure 2 implies that the 1980s saw a significant increase in the 
growth rate of economic philosophy citations. At this time, the debate between RoE and RiE 
brought scholars from different backgrounds into a debate on the methodology of economic 
theorizing. Further citations show (see Tables 1 to 4) that (1) McCloskey’s “The Rhetoric of 
Economics” (1983) and The Rhetoric of Economics (1985) proved a catalyst, prompting an 
intense debate between RoE and RiE until the end of the 1990s, that (2) the debate between 
RoE and RiE abated in the 2000s, and that (3) today economic philosophy hosts a rich variety 
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of debates beyond the RoE and RiE debate, including but not limited to behavioral 
economics, experimental economics, neuroeconomics, and evolutionism. In the wake of the 
RoE and RiE debate, economic philosophy broke itself free from a variety of an “un-
autonomous” issues, originating from subfields of economics, including economic 
psychology, development economics, “positive economics,” and other topics discussed by 
such economists as Lionel Robbins, Terence Hutchison, and Milton Friedman from the 1950s 
to 1970s. RoE and RiE helped a new field of research to emerge in the 1980s in which certain 
debates, such as falsificationism, growth of knowledge, and other issues introduced by 
philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos, have taken 
place with specific attention to economics. 
Economic philosophy has therefore become an autonomous discipline, distinct from 
economics. Bibliometric data suggests that economic philosophy has diverged intellectually, 
if not totally separated, from the scholarly agenda in the applied fields of economics. Today, 
economic philosophy has an independent intellectual agenda that only specialized journals of 
economic philosophy are interested in publishing. The literature on economic philosophy has 
the capacity to produce new debates and self-regulate the conversations around these debates 
without referring to the outside literature of computer science and physics. The debate 
between RoE and RiE has functioned as an incubatory process that increased the significance 
of economic philosophy exponentially. Of course, the debate between RoE and RiE was not 
the only significant debate in economic philosophy during the relevant period. Economic 
philosophers have also debated a wide range of issues with regard to evolutionary economics 
(Witt 1993, 2003, Hodgson 1993, 1998, Vromen 2004), (new and original) institutional 
economics (Vromen 1995, Rutherford 1994, Hodgson 1988), ethics and justice (Nozick 1975, 
Rawls 1971), prediction (Friedman 1984 [1953], Boland 1979, Mäki 1992a), abstraction and 
isolation (Lawson 1989, Mäki 1992b), positivism and postmodernism (Ruccio and Amariglio 
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2003, Caldwell 1982), feminism (Ferber and Nelson 1993, Barker and Kuiper 2003), and 
causation and explanation (Psillos 2002, Mäki 1990, Hoover 2001). However, the debate 
between RoE and RiE has both long lasted and had significant implications for many other 
debates in the field. Many economic philosophers after the 1980s either wrote a book, article, 
or commentary on the subject, engaging themselves in the debate (Rosenberg 1988, Hausman 
1998, Hands 1997, Davis 1990, Blaug 1994, Fox 1997). A number of those, who have widely 
contributed to economic philosophy are philosopher of science and are doing research in 
departments other than economics, such as Nancy Cartwright, Alexander Rosenberg, and 
Margaret Archer. For them, the debate between RoE and RiE is worth discussing, at least to 
the extent that economic philosophy and the history of economics has become an independent 
and influential field of research in social sciences and humanities.  
Debates in economic philosophy: Past and present 
TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HEREABOUT 
The emergence of the traditions of RoE and RiE are the result of the debates that took place in 
the intellectual pathways that post-modernism and social constructivism have generated 
against the positivist philosophy of science since the 1960s (Hands 2001b, 1-12, Boylan and 
O'Gorman 1995, 8-35). Eminent philosophers of science in the traditions of neo-pragmatism, 
such as Stanley Fish, George Lakoff, and Richard Rorty, greatly influenced Deirdre 
McCloskey (McCloskey 1994b, 1990b, 1985), one of the most influential figures in economic 
philosophy since the 1980s. However, until the 1980s, economics has not been investigated 
philosophically as thoroughly and as widely as sociology and political science had been.  
Herbert Simon was a leading philosopher of the late twentieth century whose writings 
were influential not only in psychology, sociology, political science, and computer sciences 
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but also in economics. By contrast, Amartya Sen, Friedrich von Hayek, Jon Elster, and 
Nicholas Georgecsu-Roegen were exceptional economists whose works have been highly 
cited in many disciplines other than economics. Interestingly, most of the cited articles in 
economic philosophy, written by eminent economists, such as George Akerlof, Armen 
Alchian, and Robert Nelson, appeared in “mainstream” economics journals before the 1980s. 
Table 2 suggests that many of the most cited scholars in economic philosophy, including 
Milton Friedman, Lionel Robbins, John Maynard Keynes, Joan Robinson, and Terence 
Hutchison, were economists for whom philosophy was not a primary field of research. 
Finally, classical economists from the mid-nineteenth century to early twentieth century, such 
as John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and Thorstein Veblen, who were investigating the “economic 
philosophy” of the social and political life, have not been the most popular sources of 
philosophical inquiry for economic philosophers, although the epistemological character of 
economics began to take shape in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was the 1980s 
when scholars started to think about the specificities of economic science and question the 
epistemological, ontological, and rhetorical structure of their science. 
TABLE 3 AND TABLE 4 HEREABOUT 
Debates on economic methodology in the 1980s and onwards were mainly concerned with the 
possibility of framing a meta-theory that would help economists produce better economics. 
Proponents of RoE, such as McCloskey and Klamer, argued that methodological inscriptions 
in the form of “3 x 5 cards” were not useful, even if possible, whereas proponents of RiE, 
including Lawson and Mäki claimed that it was both possible and useful to under-labor for 
economics and that it would help “[clarify] the cognitive schemes, conceptual tools, etc., at 
work behind scientific practices” (Lawson, Peacock, and Pratten 1996). The peculiarity of this 
debate lies in the fact that even if economic methodology were “positively harmful” (Hahn 
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1992, see also Backhouse 2010) or “bourgeois” (McCloskey 1985, 24-27), such arguments 
would have still been philosophical in nature. In other words, even if economic methodology 
was dead (Hands 2001a), economic philosophy could not be argued useless and impossible 
for the simple reason that one could only philosophically claim that economic methodology is 
or is not useless and impossible. It is interesting that one of the first salvos in the field of 
economic philosophy was an attempt to reduce the efforts of economic philosophy to 
economic methodology and show that economic methodology is useless for better economics. 
It has long been considered that RoE and RiE are two opposed traditions in economic 
philosophy. Although proponents of RoE and RiE deeply disagree on a number of issues, 
such as whether economic reality exists independently from each of us or whether better 
economic methodology is a condition for better economics, one may appraise the significance 
of the debate between RoE and RiE on the basis that both have been significant criticisms of 
mainstream economics. Indeed, one observes more corresponding concerns between RoE and 
RiE over the current state of economics than inconsistent views on longstanding philosophical 
issues.  
This essay does not intend to resolve conflicting issues between RoE and RiE. But it is 
worth mentioning, in passing, that the debate between RoE and RiE, especially during the 
1990s, has been shaped more by disagreements about their different world views than on their 
criticism of mainstream economics. However, as Lawson has argued recently (Lawson 2006), 
heterodox views in economics could be considered as a division of labor, “as approaching the 
same totality but with a distinguishing set of concerns, emphases, motivating interests and 
(so) questions.” As a matter of fact, in Economics and Reality (1997), Lawson mentions 
McCloskey thrice (five times including footnotes), in Reorienting Economics (2003) only 
once (thrice including footnotes). (Lawson does not cite Klamer at all.) In none of his works 
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is Lawson as critical of McCloskey as he is critical of the deductivist methodology in 
economics. Moreover, Lawson makes several claims parallel to McCloskey’s, such as that 
“the essential mode of inference sponsored by transcendental realism is neither induction nor 
deduction but one that can be styled retroduction or abduction or ‘as if” reasoning. It consists 
in the movement, on the basis of analogy and metaphor amongst other things, from a 
conception of some phenomenon of interest to a conception of some totally different type of 
thing, mechanism, structure or condition that, at least in part, is responsible for the given 
phenomenon” (Lawson 1997, 24). Lawson also acknowledges the divergence between 
“official” methodologies and “unofficial” methodologies (or, in McCloskey’s terms, big M 
and small m methodologies) when he says that there is an “incongruity between official and 
actual stances on methodology” (Lawson 1997 39). Disagreements between Lawson and 
McCloskey came later, as Lawson’s critical ontology evolved into an anti-postmodernist 
social theory while McCloskey’s criticism has been explicitly a part of postmodernist critical 
theory. 
An unusual tension in economic philosophy is between the traditions of critical 
realism and scientific realism, in which Mäki and Lawson compete on rather arbitrary 
grounds. Mäki, a defender of scientific realism, claims that his approach to economic 
philosophy is a “bottom-up” approach whereas the critical realism of Lawson adopts a “top-
down” approach. Though, Lawson claims that Mäki gets him “very wrong.” “He is wrong, 
and possibly mischievous,” Lawson claims, “in the way he characterises me, and I think it is 
misleading, or unhelpful, to present the options in such a dichotomous fashion” (Hirsch and 
DesRoches 2009). 
Despite considerable overlap and philosophical parallelism between these two 
traditions of realism in economics (Hodge 2007, Hands 2001b, 320-334), it is not perfectly 
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clear how their efforts to show the inadequacy of orthodox views in economics are distinct. 
Citation figures cannot illustrate the attention that the authors pay to the differences in their 
philosophies. In an interview, Mäki claims, without providing evidence, that “as I tried to 
apply Bhaskar’s ideas in my emerging realist philosophy of economics, within a few years I 
abandoned them as too simplistic for the purpose (as you know, some years later Bhaskar’s 
ideas were discovered by Tony Lawson and used in arguments that I think distort facts about 
economics)” (Mirales-Flores 2008, italics added). Of course, Lawson disagreed: “So the 
distinction that Mäki draws between his approach and mine is not right; nor do I believe it is 
especially helpful. I am pleased you asked the question. It gives me the opportunity to express 
a view on the matter in this forum where Mäki is clearly influential. Perhaps Mäki will think I 
misrepresent him in turn. I hope I do not.  But if so I hope he replies” (Hirsch and DesRoches 
2009). Mäki has not yet replied. 
I contend that the distinctions between Mäki and Lawson’s forms of realism are rather 
“subjective” and that there are few, if any, “deep” conflicting issues between the two eminent 
scholars. As I argued before, main trends in the recent history of economic philosophy have 
emerged out of the concerns of non-mainstream economists since the 1980s, largely 
developing by utilizing the opposing views from within economics discipline. However, non-
intellectual causes have also assisted in the emergence of diverging intellectual pathways 
within the discipline. External factors, such as the political, social, and geographical positions 
of scholars, have driven debates throughout the history of economic philosophy just as much 
as internal debates have. Ideological schisms, personal tensions, and intellectual networks, 
which are often proclaimed as driving the motors of dispute in the history of economics, are 
all determinants of variation of theories and viewpoints in economic philosophy. Any of Mäki 
and Lawson’s students and colleagues would adamantly assert that the controversy here is 
mainly due to “deep troubles” in the intellectual networks of scientific realism and critical 
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realism. As Randall Collins writes in The Sociology of Philosophies (1998, 880-881) “[t]he 
very concept of a deep trouble combines an element of realism with its inevitable 
consequence of splitting realities. Deep troubles are discovered by the network, not merely 
contrived; they are obdurate and unmalleable; they constrain and shape the path of the 
philosophical network across generations ... Even philosophy, ..., the field whose creativity 
battens on self-propagating difficulties, makes discoveries about a reality of its own.” 
Concluding remarks 
In this essay, I have used bibliometric data in conjunction with background knowledge in 
economic philosophy to argue that economic philosophy has received attention of many 
heterodox scholars, from within and outside of economics, in a continuously increasing 
fashion since the 1960s. The 1980s gave rise to a general interest in RoE, criticizing 
mainstream theorizing (i.e. positivist views) in economics. The subsequent debate between 
RoE and RiE took place during the formative years of economic philosophy, during which 
economic philosophy separated itself into an autonomous field of research.  
Economic philosophy flourished, based on general criticisms of the conditions of 
economics from the 1980s onwards. As Lawson (2006) argues, RoE and RiE can and should 
be considered a division of labor in heterodox economics, among many other streams of 
thought. Perhaps, one could even argue that this debate was the “birth pangs” of economic 
philosophy achieving autonomy. Now, the question is as follows: Will economic philosophy 
continue to host a genre of scholarly criticism from within economics or will it become a 
source of conservatism, serving to develop mainstream economics? Only time will tell. 
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Figure 1 and 2, prepared in December 2012, provide graphs regarding the evolution of citation figures in economic philosophy over years. Only ISI articles are covered. 
Authors with identical surnames (such as Elster, Simon, and Lawson) who publish in areas other than economic philosophy are checked and irrelevant citations are singled 
out.
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On the Futility of Criticizing the Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis L. Boland. 1981. AER 71 (5): 1031-1036 224 68
The Present State of Institutional Economics W. Samuels. 1995. CJE 19 (4): 569-590 192 45
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* The sum of the article and the book, both of which were published with the same title
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